Motions for Judge Johnston should not be set for presentment. Rather, the Court will schedule motions for presentment as needed.
Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(a)(2)
Parties to cases alleging diversity jurisdiction are alerted to amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2), which requires each party to file a statement disclosing its citizenship.
The information on this and linked pages contains important information about my pretrial case management procedures. Please take the time to read it carefully. These policies and rules have been designed to facilitate the prompt efficient and equitable disposition of civil cases on my docket. The success of this court's trial procedures depends on your willingness to familiarize yourself with these materials and to act accordingly. Counsel will be expected to fully explain to the court any failure to comply with the court's pretrial procedures which include but are not limited to the following highlights:
• lead counsel must appear at the initial status hearing prepared to discuss all aspects of the case including anticipated discovery;
• counsel must arrive to Court on time;
• counsel must appear in person for presentment of motions;
• counsel must not operate a vehicle and must be in a quiet location for telephonic status hearings;
• counsel cannot stipulate to extend any discovery deadline set in the case management order; and
• parties must provide notice to a non-party of any motion to enforce a subpoena on that non-party.
Relief may be obtained only by filing a motion with the court, not through calls to the Court's staff.
Courtesy paper copies must be mailed or delivered to Operations Specialist Yvonne Pedroza in Room 2200. Please do not bring courtesy copies to chambers: they will not be accepted and no confirmation signature will be available. We do not have capabilities for faxed or e-mailed courtesy copies. If providing courtesy copies is too onerous on a party, such as a pro se party, the party can request to be relieved of this requirement. A simple one page motion would work. Alternatively, a party can verbally request to be relieved from the requirement by asking at a status or motion hearing, including any proceeding before the Magistrate Judge.
DO NOT attempt to e-mail Judge Johnston directly. Proposed orders must be directed to Judge Johnston's proposed order inbox, and all other documents must be filed.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) can have many advantages over traditional litigation. ADR generally leads parties to a faster resolution of their case; is less expensive than the formal litigation process; and allows parties to craft creative solutions tailored to their needs and underlying interests. Recognizing these benefits, the court has developed its Mediation Program to give all parties an opportunity to take advantage of what ADR can offer.
At all initial status conferences, the parties must be prepared to discuss the issue of mediation. The court’s description of its Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan and its Local Rules for the Program can be accessed through the Mediation Program for the Western Division webpage or retrieved from the Clerk’s Office. The parties shall familiarize themselves with these documents, along with the Court's Case Management Order, so that they are prepared to discuss the possibility of mediation at the initial status conference. The Court's Case Management Order requires that all counsel certify that they have discussed with their clients the benefits of the Mediation Program, among other things. By certifying that they have done so, counsel are certifying to the Court that they have complied with the Court's order. Obviously, false certifications made in Court orders have consequences.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) can have many advantages over traditional litigation. ADR generally leads parties to a faster resolution of their case; is less expensive than the formal litigation process; and allows parties to craft creative solutions tailored to their needs and underlying interests. Recognizing these benefits, the court has developed its Mediation Program to give all parties an opportunity to take advantage of what ADR can offer.
At all initial status conferences, the parties must be prepared to discuss the issue of mediation. The court’s description of its Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan and its Local Rules for the Program can be accessed through the Mediation Program for the Western Division webpage or retrieved from the Clerk’s Office. The parties shall familiarize themselves with these documents, along with the Court's Case Management Order, so that they are prepared to discuss the possibility of mediation at the initial status conference. The Court's Case Management Order requires that all counsel certify that they have discussed with their clients the benefits of the Mediation Program, among other things. By certifying that they have done so, counsel are certifying to the Court that they have complied with the Court's order. Obviously, false certifications made in Court orders have consequences.
The Court expects the parties to hold a 26(f) conference before the initial status conference. At the initial status conference, the Court will provide a deadline for filing a joint proposed Case Management Order. The proposed Case Management Order shall be e-filed by the deadline. The parties must use the following fillable form for the proposed Case Management Order. It shall not be retyped. Additional pages may be attached for information that does not fit on the form, such as the names of additional parties and/or counsel. Parties' Proposed Case Management Order (revised 3/4/2024) |
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The Court expects the parties to hold a 26(f) conference before the initial status conference. At the initial status conference, the Court will provide a deadline for filing a joint proposed Case Management Order. The proposed Case Management Order shall be e-filed by the deadline. The parties must use the following fillable form for the proposed Case Management Order. It shall not be retyped. Additional pages may be attached for information that does not fit on the form, such as the names of additional parties and/or counsel. Parties' Proposed Case Management Order (revised 3/4/2024) |
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In the most primitive concepts of justice, one of the fundamental requisites for the exercise of judicial authority over the person or property of another is notice. The exceptions to this rule are rare indeed.
Skarpinski v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 98 N.E.2d 858, 859 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1951)
Default is a drastic remedy. Consequently, the process used must be
carefully followed, including providing the proper notice to the party against
which default is being sought (“defaulting party”). Default judgments sought
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) require a two-step process. Counsel must
not conflate the two procedures and must rigorously adhere to the time frames
specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
First, there must be an entry of default, either by the Clerk of the Court or
by a court order directing the Clerk to enter the default. A written
request for an entry of default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) shall be
accompanied by an affidavit or declaration showing that the defaulting party:
(1) is not an infant, in the military, or an incompetent person; (2) has failed
to plead or otherwise defend the action; and (3) has been properly served with
the pleading. A copy of the proof of service must also be attached to the motion if not already docketed.
Second, there must be a motion for default judgment. A party moving for a
default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) shall file a motion and
supporting legal documents and properly notice the motion for
presentment. Service of the motion for default judgment and notice of presentment must occur at
least seven (7) days before the motion for default judgment is presented.
The Court will strike all motions for default judgment that fail to provide
sufficient notice. The moving party shall also append as exhibits to the
motion for default judgment: (1) a copy of the Clerk’s entry of default; (2)
supporting affidavits or declarations; and (3) a proposed form of default
judgment. The motion, exhibits, and notice of presentment shall be mailed by regular and
certified mail to the defaulting party at the last known address of the
defaulting party. A copy of the return receipt evidencing delivery, when
returned by the post office, shall be filed with the Court. In cases
involving joint and several liability, it may be premature to move for a
default judgment against one defendant in a multi-defendant case because a
damages hearing will not be held until the liability of each non-defaulting
defendant has been resolved. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.,
617F.2d 1248, 1262 (7th Cir. 1980). However, a determination of damages against
the defaulting party can be made if the claims against the non-defaulting
parties are dismissed. See Domanus v. Lewcki, 742 F.3d 290,
304(7th Cir. 2014).
As provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) a default judgment for a sum certain may be sought from the clerk by written request accompanied by an affidavit providing the information detailed in the rule.
Failure to comply with this standing order will result in the denial of the motion.
In the most primitive concepts of justice, one of the fundamental requisites for the exercise of judicial authority over the person or property of another is notice. The exceptions to this rule are rare indeed.
Skarpinski v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 98 N.E.2d 858, 859 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1951)
Default is a drastic remedy. Consequently, the process used must be
carefully followed, including providing the proper notice to the party against
which default is being sought (“defaulting party”). Default judgments sought
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) require a two-step process. Counsel must
not conflate the two procedures and must rigorously adhere to the time frames
specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
First, there must be an entry of default, either by the Clerk of the Court or
by a court order directing the Clerk to enter the default. A written
request for an entry of default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) shall be
accompanied by an affidavit or declaration showing that the defaulting party:
(1) is not an infant, in the military, or an incompetent person; (2) has failed
to plead or otherwise defend the action; and (3) has been properly served with
the pleading. A copy of the proof of service must also be attached to the motion if not already docketed.
Second, there must be a motion for default judgment. A party moving for a
default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) shall file a motion and
supporting legal documents and properly notice the motion for
presentment. Service of the motion for default judgment and notice of presentment must occur at
least seven (7) days before the motion for default judgment is presented.
The Court will strike all motions for default judgment that fail to provide
sufficient notice. The moving party shall also append as exhibits to the
motion for default judgment: (1) a copy of the Clerk’s entry of default; (2)
supporting affidavits or declarations; and (3) a proposed form of default
judgment. The motion, exhibits, and notice of presentment shall be mailed by regular and
certified mail to the defaulting party at the last known address of the
defaulting party. A copy of the return receipt evidencing delivery, when
returned by the post office, shall be filed with the Court. In cases
involving joint and several liability, it may be premature to move for a
default judgment against one defendant in a multi-defendant case because a
damages hearing will not be held until the liability of each non-defaulting
defendant has been resolved. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.,
617F.2d 1248, 1262 (7th Cir. 1980). However, a determination of damages against
the defaulting party can be made if the claims against the non-defaulting
parties are dismissed. See Domanus v. Lewcki, 742 F.3d 290,
304(7th Cir. 2014).
As provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) a default judgment for a sum certain may be sought from the clerk by written request accompanied by an affidavit providing the information detailed in the rule.
Failure to comply with this standing order will result in the denial of the motion.
The 3-day notice requirement does not apply to the filing of emergency motions. To qualify as an emergency, a motion must arise from an unforeseen circumstance. If a party needs to present an emergency motion, the moving party must phone the Operations Specialist before filing the motion and provide the general nature of the motion and the reason it requires emergency treatment. A party seeking to present an emergency motion must make reasonable efforts to provide the opposing party with actual notice of the motion. Those efforts must be stated in the motion. |
The 3-day notice requirement does not apply to the filing of emergency motions. To qualify as an emergency, a motion must arise from an unforeseen circumstance. If a party needs to present an emergency motion, the moving party must phone the Operations Specialist before filing the motion and provide the general nature of the motion and the reason it requires emergency treatment. A party seeking to present an emergency motion must make reasonable efforts to provide the opposing party with actual notice of the motion. Those efforts must be stated in the motion. |
At the initial status hearing on cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court will provide a deadline for filing a joint proposed FLSA Scheduling Order in lieu of a proposed Case Management Order. The parties must use the following fillable form for the proposed FLSA Scheduling Order. It shall not be retyped. Upon completion, the parties shall submit the proposed FLSA Scheduling Order to the Court’s proposed order inbox at Proposed_Order_Johnston@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
Click here for FLSA Scheduling Order (revised 3/4/2024).
At the initial status hearing on cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court will provide a deadline for filing a joint proposed FLSA Scheduling Order in lieu of a proposed Case Management Order. The parties must use the following fillable form for the proposed FLSA Scheduling Order. It shall not be retyped. Upon completion, the parties shall submit the proposed FLSA Scheduling Order to the Court’s proposed order inbox at Proposed_Order_Johnston@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
Click here for FLSA Scheduling Order (revised 3/4/2024).
If moving counsel is aware that there is no objection to a motion, or that the motion is agreed, that information must be stated in the title and body of the motion.
Counsel or a party must appear in person for the presentment of a motion. Noticing a motion for presentment telephonically does not get around the Court's requirement that motions be presented in person.
For status hearings, the Court may allow the parties to participate telephonically if, in its discretion, the circumstances of the case allow for a telephonic status. Status hearings will be telephonic only if ordered by the Court. During a telephonic status hearing, counsel shall not operate motor vehicles or heavy machinery during the call. Likewise, during telephonic status calls, counsel should be in a quiet location. By way of example, a hallway in the Daley Center, any property of or near the CTA, and counsel’s children’s day care are not considered quiet locations. Although a golf course might be a quiet location, it is not an appropriate location for a telephonic status hearing. Before participating in a telephonic status hearing, counsel must first read this Court’s standing order on Telephonic Status Hearings.
A courtesy copy of all motions must be delivered to Operations Specialist Yvonne Pedroza in Room 2200 at least 48 hours before the time of presentment.
Parties must include with their motion or any supporting memorandum copies of any authority that is published only on an electronic database, such as Westlaw and Lexis. Copies of that authority must be legible. Absent leave of Court, all motions and memoranda of law must comply with the 15-page limitation set forth in Local Rule 7.1. Parties must also ensure that a motion or memorandum is double spaced. Line spacing of 1.5 is no longer permitted under the Local Rules. The Court requires compliance with Local Rule 5.2, which requires that a judge’s copy must be bound on the left side and must have protruding tabs for exhibits, and further requires a list of exhibits if more than one exhibit is attached.
Judge Johnston will not hear or consider any discovery motion unless there has been a 'meet and confer' meeting between the parties. Any motion for discovery or production of documents, shall state when and how the movant complied with the meet and confer meeting. Local Rule 37.2.
If a party is seeking to enforce a subpoena on a non-party, the party must provide notice of the motion to that non-party.
Except for discovery motions involving privilege issues, the Court will generally rule on discovery motions on the day of presentment after argument and without further briefing. But nothing prevents a party from filing a written response to a discovery motion before the motion is set for presentment.
Except to the extent specified by the court on motion of either party, discovery must be completed before the discovery closing date. Discovery requested before the discovery closing date, but not scheduled for completion before the discovery closing date, does not comply with this order.
Discovery issues, including motions to extend discovery, must be presented to the Court before the close of discovery. In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation, 231 F.R.D. 331, 332 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Indeed, the Court might not consider discovery issues long known to the parties but not brought to the Court's attention until the eve of the close of discovery. Haviland v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (S.D. Iowa 2010).
If moving counsel is aware that there is no objection to a motion, or that the motion is agreed, that information must be stated in the title and body of the motion.
Counsel or a party must appear in person for the presentment of a motion. Noticing a motion for presentment telephonically does not get around the Court's requirement that motions be presented in person.
For status hearings, the Court may allow the parties to participate telephonically if, in its discretion, the circumstances of the case allow for a telephonic status. Status hearings will be telephonic only if ordered by the Court. During a telephonic status hearing, counsel shall not operate motor vehicles or heavy machinery during the call. Likewise, during telephonic status calls, counsel should be in a quiet location. By way of example, a hallway in the Daley Center, any property of or near the CTA, and counsel’s children’s day care are not considered quiet locations. Although a golf course might be a quiet location, it is not an appropriate location for a telephonic status hearing. Before participating in a telephonic status hearing, counsel must first read this Court’s standing order on Telephonic Status Hearings.
A courtesy copy of all motions must be delivered to Operations Specialist Yvonne Pedroza in Room 2200 at least 48 hours before the time of presentment.
Parties must include with their motion or any supporting memorandum copies of any authority that is published only on an electronic database, such as Westlaw and Lexis. Copies of that authority must be legible. Absent leave of Court, all motions and memoranda of law must comply with the 15-page limitation set forth in Local Rule 7.1. Parties must also ensure that a motion or memorandum is double spaced. Line spacing of 1.5 is no longer permitted under the Local Rules. The Court requires compliance with Local Rule 5.2, which requires that a judge’s copy must be bound on the left side and must have protruding tabs for exhibits, and further requires a list of exhibits if more than one exhibit is attached.
Judge Johnston will not hear or consider any discovery motion unless there has been a 'meet and confer' meeting between the parties. Any motion for discovery or production of documents, shall state when and how the movant complied with the meet and confer meeting. Local Rule 37.2.
If a party is seeking to enforce a subpoena on a non-party, the party must provide notice of the motion to that non-party.
Except for discovery motions involving privilege issues, the Court will generally rule on discovery motions on the day of presentment after argument and without further briefing. But nothing prevents a party from filing a written response to a discovery motion before the motion is set for presentment.
Except to the extent specified by the court on motion of either party, discovery must be completed before the discovery closing date. Discovery requested before the discovery closing date, but not scheduled for completion before the discovery closing date, does not comply with this order.
Discovery issues, including motions to extend discovery, must be presented to the Court before the close of discovery. In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation, 231 F.R.D. 331, 332 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Indeed, the Court might not consider discovery issues long known to the parties but not brought to the Court's attention until the eve of the close of discovery. Haviland v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (S.D. Iowa 2010).
In the event that a party withholds otherwise discoverable information on the ground of privilege, the withholding party generally must provide a log of the documents withheld on the ground of privilege. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) and Advisory Committee Comments to 1993 Amendments. Any privilege log must be detailed enough to enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege asserted, and should include: (1) the name and capacity of each individual from whom or to whom a document and any attachments were sent (including which persons are lawyers); (2) the date of the document and any attachments; (3) the type of document; (4) the Bates numbers of the documents, (5) the nature of the privilege asserted; and (6) a description of the subject matter in sufficient detail to determine if legal advice was sought or revealed, or if the document constitutes work product;. See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 84, 88 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
The Court reminds the parties that the meet and confer requirements of Local Rule 37.2 apply to privilege disputes, just as they do to other discovery disputes.
In the event that a party withholds otherwise discoverable information on the ground of privilege, the withholding party generally must provide a log of the documents withheld on the ground of privilege. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) and Advisory Committee Comments to 1993 Amendments. Any privilege log must be detailed enough to enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege asserted, and should include: (1) the name and capacity of each individual from whom or to whom a document and any attachments were sent (including which persons are lawyers); (2) the date of the document and any attachments; (3) the type of document; (4) the Bates numbers of the documents, (5) the nature of the privilege asserted; and (6) a description of the subject matter in sufficient detail to determine if legal advice was sought or revealed, or if the document constitutes work product;. See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 84, 88 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
The Court reminds the parties that the meet and confer requirements of Local Rule 37.2 apply to privilege disputes, just as they do to other discovery disputes.
All litigants are directed to Local Rule 5.8 for the filing of material under seal. Also a standing order has been entered by Judge Reinhard as to the form that is to be attached to the envelope of the sealed document. Standing Order Implementing General Rule 10 of the Local Rules. Attached Form
Parties are reminded that the standard to seal a document is much higher than to mark something confidential, and thus any application to file a document under seal should contain an explanation, on a document by document basis, why each should be sealed. See generally Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Secrecy is fine at the discovery stage, before the material enters the judicial record. But those documents, usually a small subset of all discovery, that influence or underpin the judicial decision are open to public inspection unless they meet the definition of trade secrets or other categories of bona fide long-term confidentiality." (citations omitted)).
All litigants are directed to Local Rule 5.8 for the filing of material under seal. Also a standing order has been entered by Judge Reinhard as to the form that is to be attached to the envelope of the sealed document. Standing Order Implementing General Rule 10 of the Local Rules. Attached Form
Parties are reminded that the standard to seal a document is much higher than to mark something confidential, and thus any application to file a document under seal should contain an explanation, on a document by document basis, why each should be sealed. See generally Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Secrecy is fine at the discovery stage, before the material enters the judicial record. But those documents, usually a small subset of all discovery, that influence or underpin the judicial decision are open to public inspection unless they meet the definition of trade secrets or other categories of bona fide long-term confidentiality." (citations omitted)).
Standing Order on Motions for Summary Judgment
1. It’s Time To Put The “Summary” Back In “Summary Judgment”
At the risk of sounding like Jerry Seinfeld, did you ever notice that procedures allegedly designed to streamline litigation often don’t (Think requests to admit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36.) Indeed, these procedures often just generate more work for everybody—the parties and the Court—without reaching the goal of a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the actions. Summary judgment motions can be like this. First, summary judgment motions are often filed unnecessarily, without real forethought. Second, summary judgment motions often result in satellite procedural litigation with a raft of ancillary filings. The Court hopes that this standing order will eliminate—or at least reduce—these occurrences. Sometimes, summary judgment motions should be filed. The goal of this standing order is for the Court to see only those kinds of motions, keeping in mind that even denied motions were not necessarily filed unnecessarily. To that end, at the close of fact discovery, the Magistrate Judge will refer the parties to this standing order whenever a party indicates its intent to file a summary judgment motion.
2. Before Filing Summary Judgment Motions Let’s Talk
Summary judgment motions aren’t cheap. Properly prepared summary judgment motions require extensive attorney time and client expense. Filing summary judgment entails more than just throwing together that short motion at the end of the process. Instead, summary judgment motions require an extensive memorandum. And experience teaches that for whatever reason counsel struggle with keeping the memorandum under 15 pages. Further, in the Northern District of Illinois, summary judgment motions also require Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact, which creates a separate significant expense.
Unfortunately, sometimes summary judgment motions are unnecessarily filed. As Judge Shadur noted years ago, filing summary judgment motions as a Pavlovian response to the close of fact discovery is an all too often occurrence. Lee v. Waukegan Hosp. Corp., No. 10 CV 2956, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36187, *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2012). A careful examination of the record after discovery has closed may reveal contested factual issues making the granting of the motion impossible. A real and thorough cost-benefit analysis should be completed before a summary judgment motion is filed. Hon. Milton I. Shadur, From the Bench: Trial or Tribulations (Rule 56 Style) , Litig., 5 (Winter 2003). Moreover, by their very nature, some actions do not lend themselves to Rule 56’s procedure. Claims of excessive force are a prime example of actions that are far less likely to result in summary judgment. Cyrus v. Town of Mukonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2010); Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005). This is true for either side—even when there is a video recording of the incident. Godinez v. City of Chicago, No. 16 CV 7344, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187996 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2019). Reasonableness is a quintessential jury question. Becker v. City of Evansville, No. 12 CV 182, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8414 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2015). To avoid unnecessary summary judgment motions, it may be helpful for the Court to hold a prefiling conference. This conference will be an informal, off-the-record discussion in chambers with lead counsel to consider whether it makes sense—economically and otherwise—to file a summary judgment motion.
So, before filing a summary judgment motion, counsel must confer and jointly submit to the Court’s proposed order inbox a date and time for the prefiling conference. During the pandemic, these prefiling conferences will be conducted telephonically. No written submissions should be made. This prefiling conference is not intended to be an oral argument on the merits of the case. Instead, any party seeking summary judgment should be prepared to identify the uncontested facts that support judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Likewise and unsurprisingly, the opposing party should be prepared to identify whether those facts are truly contested. If counsel don’t know what these facts are and whether they are truly contested by the time of the prefiling conference, then that’s a sign of a bigger problem. Also, don’t start writing the summary judgment motion before the prefiling conference. Again, don’t submit anything in writing supporting or opposing summary judgment before the prefiling conference. It won’t be read. But rest assured, no party will ever be prevented from filing a summary judgment motion that is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The goal of the prefiling conference is to have a careful, informed discussion of the issues before significant time and expense have been incurred. If lead counsel believe it will be helpful for a client to be present during the prefiling conference, they are more than welcome.
Prefiling conferences should be set for either a Monday or Friday at 11:00 a.m. The parties should submit a second choice for a date in case of a conflict with the Court’s schedule. Once submitted, the Court will confirm the date of the conference by minute order.
3. Filing Summary Judgment Motions: What To Exclude And Include
Summary judgment is designed to resolve an action in a summary fashion. But, like The Trouble with Tribbles, summary judgment motions often spawn a cascade of ancillary motions that become overwhelming.
Take, for example, the timing of summary judgment motions. Filing a summary judgment motion before the close of fact discovery can be problematic. A deposition after the filing might elicit sworn testimony that creates a genuine issue of material fact that renders the motion meritless. Moreover, the responding party can always file a Rule 56(d) affidavit that simply forestalls the summary judgment motion, particularly when fact discovery has not closed. Smith v. OSF HealthCare System, 933 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2019). The process only gets gummed up further if the movant then contests the Rule 56(d) affidavit, which will then beget a reply brief. And a summary judgment motion filed before the close of fact discovery also dovetails into the problem of multiple or successive motions. It should come as no surprise that district court judges don’t like multiple or successive motions for summary judgment. See generally 11 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §56.121[1][a] at 56-299 (3d ed. 2019). Certainly, sometimes successive summary judgment motions make sense and a court has discretion to allow them. Id. For example, a summary judgment motion for failing to exhaust administrative remedies may be appropriate before the close of all fact discovery. (Of course, this assumes that summary judgment is even appropriate in that circumstance. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2015).) The prefiling conference discussed above should hopefully resolve these issues.
Another ancillary motion in the brood is the motion for leave to file a surrreply, which are disfavored. See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 903 (7th Cir. 2012). The common argument in favor of surreplies is that a new argument (as opposed to a reply to an argument raised in the response brief) was raised for the first time. Raising new arguments for the first time in a reply brief is dirty pool. See Darick M. v. Berryhill, No. 17 CV 50140, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21196, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019). The Court can see that practice for what it is. There is no need to file a motion for a surreply to alert the Court to this chicanery. Sometimes, the purported assertion that the reason for filing a surreply is to address new arguments is simply a pretext for trying to get in the last word. That is just a different form of dirty pool. Naturally, surreplies beget requests to file “sur-surreplies.” The Court doesn’t want to see them either.
Ancillary filings also grow out of Local Rule 56.1 filings. Rule 56.1 is supposed to simplify summary judgment determinations, not invite satellite litigation. Mirza v. Dept. of Treasury ex rel. Ruben, 17 F. Supp. 2d 759, 762 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (discussing former Local Rules 12(M) and 12(N)); see also Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994) (purpose is to assist the court with a roadmap). The most common ancillary filing relating to Local Rule 56.1 is the dreaded motion to strike. Motions to strike are strongly disfavored. Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 464 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J., in chambers). A motion to strike begets both a response and reply brief. Don’t file motions to strike. There’s a better way. If a party believes that the other side's brief contains inaccurate facts or that the other side's Local Rule 56.1 statement contains an unsupported assertion, then the complaining party should argue that in the response or reply brief. Indeed, motions to strike should be constrained to their limited purpose of attacking pleadings as identified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which does not include Daubert challenges. (More on those later.) Another common ancillary motion relating to Local Rule 56.1 is the “motion to deem facts admitted.” Don’t file those either. They are unnecessary, and like a motion to strike, result in at least two more filings. The Court knows that if a party does not respond or fails to respond properly to Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts that those facts are admitted. See Farina v. Ciccone Food Prods., No. 04 CV 2383, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2005). Motions to deem facts admitted are even more problematic when the moving party itself failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1. See Blackhawk Molding Co. v. Portola Packaging, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Kids these days call that a “self own.” The required filings are plenty. There is no need to file these additional motions, especially when they produce even more filings.
Having said all that, motions for summary judgment and responses must comply with Local Rules 56.1(a) and 56.1(b), as well as the procedures set out in this standing order. The Local Rules and this standing order are not mere suggestions or the Court’s musings on best practices. Failure to abide by the Local Rules and this standing order may result in the Court striking briefs, disregarding statements of fact, deeming statements of fact admitted, and denying summary judgment. See Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009). With regard to Local Rule 56.1, counsel must comply with the following:
All statements of undisputed material facts and their responses must be filed separately from the memoranda of law and must include the line, paragraph, or page number where the supporting material may be found in the record. You can even highlight the specific relevant portion if you think that’s helpful. But if you end up highlighting an entire page, that might tell you something.
The movant shall not file more than 80 statements of undisputed material facts without prior leave of the Court. Those statements must be limited to concise, discrete factual propositions, not paragraphs of assertions. The respondent shall be limited to 40 statements of undisputed material facts without prior leave of the Court. These statements must similarly be limited to concise, discrete facts.
For cases involving pro se litigants, in addition to the motion, memorandum, statement of facts, and exhibits, counsel must also serve the pro se party with (1) the statement required by Local Rule 56.2, (2) an entire copy of Local Rule 56.1, (3) a copy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and (4) a copy of this standing order.
The Court has one last point on the topic of Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact. Try to tell a coherent, chronological story with the facts. The statement of facts should not read like a Quentin Tarantino script. And have a point: It makes it so much more interesting for the reader.
The only ancillary motions that might be appropriate with a summary judgment motion relate to expert testimony. There are two. The first motion is a motion in limine seeking to exclude opinion testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Boatman v. Comcast of the South, L.P., No. 17 CV 536, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24458, at *24 n.5 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2020). That is a substantive motion that should be filed separately. Some claims require expert testimony to survive, and if the testimony does not meet the requirement of Daubert, then summary judgment will be granted. See, e.g., Winters v. Fru-Con, Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2007). Motions to exclude expert opinions under Daubert should only be filed either with summary judgment briefing or at trial. The Court is fully aware that occasionally a party will want to bar an expert’s opinion before retaining its own expert to allegedly save money. The Court is also often told that this motion will “streamline the case.” But see the first sentence of this standing order. This procedure is unlikely to save time or money. Indeed, if a party is so convinced that the opponent’s expert’s opinion is junk, then the party should be confident in its decision not to hire its own rebuttal expert. The second motion is a motion to bar opinions not disclosed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), (C). Opinions appearing for the first time in summary judgment briefing will be barred, unless the proponent can establish that the failure to timely disclose the opinions is harmless or substantially justified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Clomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 641-43 (7th Cir. 2008). Be forewarned, that is a heavy burden to meet. See Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 456-57 (7th Cir. 2007) (barring at summary judgment expert affidavit first disclosed in summary judgment briefing). And, even in the rare circumstances you meet that burden, there will be other consequences, including financial. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. City of Dixon, No. 11 CV 50121, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29453, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2014). Parties who believe that expert opinions were not properly disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2) should immediately file a separate motion to bar. The Court will consider the motion at the same time as the summary judgment motion.
If parties have any other questions about summary judgment motions, they can raise them at the informal conference.
Standing Order on Motions for Summary Judgment
1. It’s Time To Put The “Summary” Back In “Summary Judgment”
At the risk of sounding like Jerry Seinfeld, did you ever notice that procedures allegedly designed to streamline litigation often don’t (Think requests to admit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36.) Indeed, these procedures often just generate more work for everybody—the parties and the Court—without reaching the goal of a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the actions. Summary judgment motions can be like this. First, summary judgment motions are often filed unnecessarily, without real forethought. Second, summary judgment motions often result in satellite procedural litigation with a raft of ancillary filings. The Court hopes that this standing order will eliminate—or at least reduce—these occurrences. Sometimes, summary judgment motions should be filed. The goal of this standing order is for the Court to see only those kinds of motions, keeping in mind that even denied motions were not necessarily filed unnecessarily. To that end, at the close of fact discovery, the Magistrate Judge will refer the parties to this standing order whenever a party indicates its intent to file a summary judgment motion.
2. Before Filing Summary Judgment Motions Let’s Talk
Summary judgment motions aren’t cheap. Properly prepared summary judgment motions require extensive attorney time and client expense. Filing summary judgment entails more than just throwing together that short motion at the end of the process. Instead, summary judgment motions require an extensive memorandum. And experience teaches that for whatever reason counsel struggle with keeping the memorandum under 15 pages. Further, in the Northern District of Illinois, summary judgment motions also require Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact, which creates a separate significant expense.
Unfortunately, sometimes summary judgment motions are unnecessarily filed. As Judge Shadur noted years ago, filing summary judgment motions as a Pavlovian response to the close of fact discovery is an all too often occurrence. Lee v. Waukegan Hosp. Corp., No. 10 CV 2956, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36187, *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2012). A careful examination of the record after discovery has closed may reveal contested factual issues making the granting of the motion impossible. A real and thorough cost-benefit analysis should be completed before a summary judgment motion is filed. Hon. Milton I. Shadur, From the Bench: Trial or Tribulations (Rule 56 Style) , Litig., 5 (Winter 2003). Moreover, by their very nature, some actions do not lend themselves to Rule 56’s procedure. Claims of excessive force are a prime example of actions that are far less likely to result in summary judgment. Cyrus v. Town of Mukonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2010); Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005). This is true for either side—even when there is a video recording of the incident. Godinez v. City of Chicago, No. 16 CV 7344, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187996 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2019). Reasonableness is a quintessential jury question. Becker v. City of Evansville, No. 12 CV 182, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8414 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2015). To avoid unnecessary summary judgment motions, it may be helpful for the Court to hold a prefiling conference. This conference will be an informal, off-the-record discussion in chambers with lead counsel to consider whether it makes sense—economically and otherwise—to file a summary judgment motion.
So, before filing a summary judgment motion, counsel must confer and jointly submit to the Court’s proposed order inbox a date and time for the prefiling conference. During the pandemic, these prefiling conferences will be conducted telephonically. No written submissions should be made. This prefiling conference is not intended to be an oral argument on the merits of the case. Instead, any party seeking summary judgment should be prepared to identify the uncontested facts that support judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Likewise and unsurprisingly, the opposing party should be prepared to identify whether those facts are truly contested. If counsel don’t know what these facts are and whether they are truly contested by the time of the prefiling conference, then that’s a sign of a bigger problem. Also, don’t start writing the summary judgment motion before the prefiling conference. Again, don’t submit anything in writing supporting or opposing summary judgment before the prefiling conference. It won’t be read. But rest assured, no party will ever be prevented from filing a summary judgment motion that is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The goal of the prefiling conference is to have a careful, informed discussion of the issues before significant time and expense have been incurred. If lead counsel believe it will be helpful for a client to be present during the prefiling conference, they are more than welcome.
Prefiling conferences should be set for either a Monday or Friday at 11:00 a.m. The parties should submit a second choice for a date in case of a conflict with the Court’s schedule. Once submitted, the Court will confirm the date of the conference by minute order.
3. Filing Summary Judgment Motions: What To Exclude And Include
Summary judgment is designed to resolve an action in a summary fashion. But, like The Trouble with Tribbles, summary judgment motions often spawn a cascade of ancillary motions that become overwhelming.
Take, for example, the timing of summary judgment motions. Filing a summary judgment motion before the close of fact discovery can be problematic. A deposition after the filing might elicit sworn testimony that creates a genuine issue of material fact that renders the motion meritless. Moreover, the responding party can always file a Rule 56(d) affidavit that simply forestalls the summary judgment motion, particularly when fact discovery has not closed. Smith v. OSF HealthCare System, 933 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2019). The process only gets gummed up further if the movant then contests the Rule 56(d) affidavit, which will then beget a reply brief. And a summary judgment motion filed before the close of fact discovery also dovetails into the problem of multiple or successive motions. It should come as no surprise that district court judges don’t like multiple or successive motions for summary judgment. See generally 11 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §56.121[1][a] at 56-299 (3d ed. 2019). Certainly, sometimes successive summary judgment motions make sense and a court has discretion to allow them. Id. For example, a summary judgment motion for failing to exhaust administrative remedies may be appropriate before the close of all fact discovery. (Of course, this assumes that summary judgment is even appropriate in that circumstance. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2015).) The prefiling conference discussed above should hopefully resolve these issues.
Another ancillary motion in the brood is the motion for leave to file a surrreply, which are disfavored. See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 903 (7th Cir. 2012). The common argument in favor of surreplies is that a new argument (as opposed to a reply to an argument raised in the response brief) was raised for the first time. Raising new arguments for the first time in a reply brief is dirty pool. See Darick M. v. Berryhill, No. 17 CV 50140, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21196, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019). The Court can see that practice for what it is. There is no need to file a motion for a surreply to alert the Court to this chicanery. Sometimes, the purported assertion that the reason for filing a surreply is to address new arguments is simply a pretext for trying to get in the last word. That is just a different form of dirty pool. Naturally, surreplies beget requests to file “sur-surreplies.” The Court doesn’t want to see them either.
Ancillary filings also grow out of Local Rule 56.1 filings. Rule 56.1 is supposed to simplify summary judgment determinations, not invite satellite litigation. Mirza v. Dept. of Treasury ex rel. Ruben, 17 F. Supp. 2d 759, 762 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (discussing former Local Rules 12(M) and 12(N)); see also Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994) (purpose is to assist the court with a roadmap). The most common ancillary filing relating to Local Rule 56.1 is the dreaded motion to strike. Motions to strike are strongly disfavored. Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 464 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J., in chambers). A motion to strike begets both a response and reply brief. Don’t file motions to strike. There’s a better way. If a party believes that the other side's brief contains inaccurate facts or that the other side's Local Rule 56.1 statement contains an unsupported assertion, then the complaining party should argue that in the response or reply brief. Indeed, motions to strike should be constrained to their limited purpose of attacking pleadings as identified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which does not include Daubert challenges. (More on those later.) Another common ancillary motion relating to Local Rule 56.1 is the “motion to deem facts admitted.” Don’t file those either. They are unnecessary, and like a motion to strike, result in at least two more filings. The Court knows that if a party does not respond or fails to respond properly to Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts that those facts are admitted. See Farina v. Ciccone Food Prods., No. 04 CV 2383, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9962, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2005). Motions to deem facts admitted are even more problematic when the moving party itself failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1. See Blackhawk Molding Co. v. Portola Packaging, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Kids these days call that a “self own.” The required filings are plenty. There is no need to file these additional motions, especially when they produce even more filings.
Having said all that, motions for summary judgment and responses must comply with Local Rules 56.1(a) and 56.1(b), as well as the procedures set out in this standing order. The Local Rules and this standing order are not mere suggestions or the Court’s musings on best practices. Failure to abide by the Local Rules and this standing order may result in the Court striking briefs, disregarding statements of fact, deeming statements of fact admitted, and denying summary judgment. See Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009). With regard to Local Rule 56.1, counsel must comply with the following:
All statements of undisputed material facts and their responses must be filed separately from the memoranda of law and must include the line, paragraph, or page number where the supporting material may be found in the record. You can even highlight the specific relevant portion if you think that’s helpful. But if you end up highlighting an entire page, that might tell you something.
The movant shall not file more than 80 statements of undisputed material facts without prior leave of the Court. Those statements must be limited to concise, discrete factual propositions, not paragraphs of assertions. The respondent shall be limited to 40 statements of undisputed material facts without prior leave of the Court. These statements must similarly be limited to concise, discrete facts.
For cases involving pro se litigants, in addition to the motion, memorandum, statement of facts, and exhibits, counsel must also serve the pro se party with (1) the statement required by Local Rule 56.2, (2) an entire copy of Local Rule 56.1, (3) a copy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and (4) a copy of this standing order.
The Court has one last point on the topic of Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact. Try to tell a coherent, chronological story with the facts. The statement of facts should not read like a Quentin Tarantino script. And have a point: It makes it so much more interesting for the reader.
The only ancillary motions that might be appropriate with a summary judgment motion relate to expert testimony. There are two. The first motion is a motion in limine seeking to exclude opinion testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Boatman v. Comcast of the South, L.P., No. 17 CV 536, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24458, at *24 n.5 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2020). That is a substantive motion that should be filed separately. Some claims require expert testimony to survive, and if the testimony does not meet the requirement of Daubert, then summary judgment will be granted. See, e.g., Winters v. Fru-Con, Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2007). Motions to exclude expert opinions under Daubert should only be filed either with summary judgment briefing or at trial. The Court is fully aware that occasionally a party will want to bar an expert’s opinion before retaining its own expert to allegedly save money. The Court is also often told that this motion will “streamline the case.” But see the first sentence of this standing order. This procedure is unlikely to save time or money. Indeed, if a party is so convinced that the opponent’s expert’s opinion is junk, then the party should be confident in its decision not to hire its own rebuttal expert. The second motion is a motion to bar opinions not disclosed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), (C). Opinions appearing for the first time in summary judgment briefing will be barred, unless the proponent can establish that the failure to timely disclose the opinions is harmless or substantially justified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Clomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 641-43 (7th Cir. 2008). Be forewarned, that is a heavy burden to meet. See Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 456-57 (7th Cir. 2007) (barring at summary judgment expert affidavit first disclosed in summary judgment briefing). And, even in the rare circumstances you meet that burden, there will be other consequences, including financial. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. City of Dixon, No. 11 CV 50121, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29453, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2014). Parties who believe that expert opinions were not properly disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2) should immediately file a separate motion to bar. The Court will consider the motion at the same time as the summary judgment motion.
If parties have any other questions about summary judgment motions, they can raise them at the informal conference.
All motions must be supported by memorandum, not to exceed 15 pages. See Local Rule 7.1. Alternatively, the motion may contain the principle argument and relevant authority that otherwise would comprise a supporting memorandum. Skeletal and unsupported arguments will not be considered and the argument will be deemed waived. See Perry v. Sullivan, 207 F.3d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 2000); American Family Mutual Insurance v. Roth, 2007 WL 2410074 at *2 (N.D.Ill. 2007)(collecting cases); McWilliams v. McWilliams, 2006 WL 3775952 (N.D.Ill. 2006)(collecting cases)
Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered. See Hodgdon v. Northwestern University, 245 F.R.D. 337, 340 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2007)(collecting cases).
Cases that are published only on electronic databases such as Westlaw and Lexis must be attached as exhibits to the memorandum.
Exhibits must be legible. For example, copies of portions of a deposition transcript should be printed as full pages, not as mini-scripts or condensed versions.
The Court urges litigants to rely on cases that were decided in the same procedural posture. In memoranda supporting or opposing a motion to dismiss, cases that were decided on summary judgment (or on appeal of summary judgment) are not particularly helpful because of the differing standards. See, e.g., Winchester v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., No. 19-CV-01356-NJR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148760, *6-7 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2020) (discussing what is required to state a claim under the FMLA versus what is required to prevail upon a claim under the FMLA); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) (“The question presented by a motion to dismiss for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed on the discovery process.”). Indeed, the Court is on dangerous ground when it relies on summary judgment opinions when it is deciding motions to dismiss. Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., No. 21-1616, at 5-6 (7th Cir. Jan. 19, 2022); Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). This applies to the inverse as well. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (An opinion decided on a motion to dismiss “is of no relevance here, since it involved not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings. The latter, unlike the former, presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”) (cleaned up). As everybody hopefully learned in the first semester of law school, counsel should rely on decisions involving motions to dismiss when briefing a motion to dismiss and decisions involving motions for summary judgment (or Rule 50) when briefing a motion for summary judgment.
All motions must be supported by memorandum, not to exceed 15 pages. See Local Rule 7.1. Alternatively, the motion may contain the principle argument and relevant authority that otherwise would comprise a supporting memorandum. Skeletal and unsupported arguments will not be considered and the argument will be deemed waived. See Perry v. Sullivan, 207 F.3d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 2000); American Family Mutual Insurance v. Roth, 2007 WL 2410074 at *2 (N.D.Ill. 2007)(collecting cases); McWilliams v. McWilliams, 2006 WL 3775952 (N.D.Ill. 2006)(collecting cases)
Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered. See Hodgdon v. Northwestern University, 245 F.R.D. 337, 340 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2007)(collecting cases).
Cases that are published only on electronic databases such as Westlaw and Lexis must be attached as exhibits to the memorandum.
Exhibits must be legible. For example, copies of portions of a deposition transcript should be printed as full pages, not as mini-scripts or condensed versions.
The Court urges litigants to rely on cases that were decided in the same procedural posture. In memoranda supporting or opposing a motion to dismiss, cases that were decided on summary judgment (or on appeal of summary judgment) are not particularly helpful because of the differing standards. See, e.g., Winchester v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., No. 19-CV-01356-NJR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148760, *6-7 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2020) (discussing what is required to state a claim under the FMLA versus what is required to prevail upon a claim under the FMLA); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) (“The question presented by a motion to dismiss for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed on the discovery process.”). Indeed, the Court is on dangerous ground when it relies on summary judgment opinions when it is deciding motions to dismiss. Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., No. 21-1616, at 5-6 (7th Cir. Jan. 19, 2022); Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). This applies to the inverse as well. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (An opinion decided on a motion to dismiss “is of no relevance here, since it involved not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings. The latter, unlike the former, presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”) (cleaned up). As everybody hopefully learned in the first semester of law school, counsel should rely on decisions involving motions to dismiss when briefing a motion to dismiss and decisions involving motions for summary judgment (or Rule 50) when briefing a motion for summary judgment.
Motions to strike are strongly disfavored. Custom Vehicles,Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 464 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook,J., in chambers). For example, if a party believes that the other side's brief contains inaccurate facts or that the other side's Local Rule 56.1 statement(in summary-judgment briefing) contains an unsupported assertion, then the complaining party should make that argument in the response or reply brief.
Likewise,the Court recognizes that raising arguments for the first time in a reply brief is dirty pool. In re Leventhal, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1328, *9 n. 3 (N.D. Ill.2012). The Court is capable of seeing that practice for what it is. There is no need to file a motion to strike the reply brief. Indeed, motions to strike should be constrained to their limited scope as identified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
Motions to strike are strongly disfavored. Custom Vehicles,Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 464 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook,J., in chambers). For example, if a party believes that the other side's brief contains inaccurate facts or that the other side's Local Rule 56.1 statement(in summary-judgment briefing) contains an unsupported assertion, then the complaining party should make that argument in the response or reply brief.
Likewise,the Court recognizes that raising arguments for the first time in a reply brief is dirty pool. In re Leventhal, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1328, *9 n. 3 (N.D. Ill.2012). The Court is capable of seeing that practice for what it is. There is no need to file a motion to strike the reply brief. Indeed, motions to strike should be constrained to their limited scope as identified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
If a defendant removes an action from state court to this Court, but then raises lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or lack of Article III standing, this Court may summarily remand the action back to state court.
On removal, the defendants have the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. The Court will not permit a defendant to simultaneously assert and challenge the Court’s jurisdiction. This behavior wastes the parties’ time and money and consumes scarce judicial resources that could be spent elsewhere. Moreover, the Court does not believe this litigation strategy complies with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 and 11(b) and the Rules of Professional Conduct, among other things.
Defendants are on notice that the Court may summarily remand. If the defendants waste the Court’s judicial resources by opposing remand, the Court will require the defendants’ counsel (not the client) to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and the Court will sanction defendants’ counsel (not the client) an amount equal to one hour of the Court’s time. That sanction will be paid to the Clerk of Court. The Court will also order the defendants’ counsel to provide a copy of the order to the client, so that the client can address with counsel the payment of attorneys’ fees for removing a case to federal court, only to ask that it be sent back to state court.
In any action removed to this Court, within 7 business days, defense counsel must also file a certification that they have read this standing order. In addition, the defendant must file a disclosure of the state(s) of its citizenship, which Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 7.1(a)(2) requires be filed at the time of removal.
If a defendant removes an action from state court to this Court, but then raises lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or lack of Article III standing, this Court may summarily remand the action back to state court.
On removal, the defendants have the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. The Court will not permit a defendant to simultaneously assert and challenge the Court’s jurisdiction. This behavior wastes the parties’ time and money and consumes scarce judicial resources that could be spent elsewhere. Moreover, the Court does not believe this litigation strategy complies with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 and 11(b) and the Rules of Professional Conduct, among other things.
Defendants are on notice that the Court may summarily remand. If the defendants waste the Court’s judicial resources by opposing remand, the Court will require the defendants’ counsel (not the client) to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and the Court will sanction defendants’ counsel (not the client) an amount equal to one hour of the Court’s time. That sanction will be paid to the Clerk of Court. The Court will also order the defendants’ counsel to provide a copy of the order to the client, so that the client can address with counsel the payment of attorneys’ fees for removing a case to federal court, only to ask that it be sent back to state court.
In any action removed to this Court, within 7 business days, defense counsel must also file a certification that they have read this standing order. In addition, the defendant must file a disclosure of the state(s) of its citizenship, which Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 7.1(a)(2) requires be filed at the time of removal.
The attorneys are to comply with LR3.2 when filing the first pleading on behalf of a party. The Judge will disqualify himself from hearing any case where he or his wife own stock in the following public company, including any affiliates:
Disney (DIS)
The attorneys are to comply with LR3.2 when filing the first pleading on behalf of a party. The Judge will disqualify himself from hearing any case where he or his wife own stock in the following public company, including any affiliates:
Disney (DIS)
Attorneys—not the Court—are responsible for making their own arguments. Furthermore, if attorneys raise an argument, the Court expects that they will do their own research and developed that argument. If the parties do not care about an argument, or a claim, enough to spend time litigating that argument or claim, then the Court should not be expected to shoulder the responsibility for them. Additionally, if after reviewing an opponent’s motion, a party wishes to abandon a claim, that party should affirmatively stipulate to that concession on the record.
1. Waiving Arguments
If a party fails to respond to an opponent’s argument, the Court will find that the argument is waived for the purpose of the pending motion (but not for the purpose of future motions). Furthermore, perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived. United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1383 (7th Cir. 1991). For example, a two-sentence “argument” that cites no legal authority is not a legal argument. It is perfunctory, and the Court will not consider it. See Martinez v. Colvin, 12 CV 50016, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41754, at *26–27 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2014) (“[T]he Court notes that parties should not view judges as bloodhounds who are merely given a whiff of an argument and then expected to search the record high and low in an effort to track down evidence to locate and capture a party’s argument.”). Additionally, when an argument effectively requires analogous reasoning (think qualified immunity) but the brief contains no analogous reasoning, the Court may find waiver. And when responding to an argument, mere contradiction rather than a developed argument results in waiver. Id. at *27 (“[M]erely contradicting an opposing party’s developed argument with a single, unsupported sentence is not an argument.”).
2. Waiving Claims
Waiver of claims is treated differently. If the plaintiff evidences an intent to abandon a claim, it will be deemed waived. But critically, merely failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment is not evidence of abandonment of the claim. This occurs, for example, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, and the plaintiff fails to respond to the motion for summary judgment on one or all of its claims. Because the defendant bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit has instructed district courts not to summarily hold for the defendant when the plaintiff fails to respond to the motion on all or some claims. Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021).
Still, when the plaintiff fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment on all or some claims, one of two things is true (or both). Either the plaintiff does not care about the claim enough to form an argument, or the plaintiff affirmatively intends to abandon the claim. In either case, the Court should not have to waste valuable judicial resources researching and deciding the issue. Thus, if a plaintiff fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, on all or a subset of the claims, the Court will order the plaintiff to show cause why the claim should not be considered abandoned. Failure to respond to the Court’s order will result in a dismissal of the claim with prejudice for want of prosecution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
3. Motions to Dismiss
“Our system of justice is adversarial, and our judges are busy people. If they are given plausible reasons for dismissing a complaint, they are not going to do the plaintiff’s research and try to discover whether there might be something to say against the defendants’ reasoning.” Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999)). If the Court is presented with a colorable argument in a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff fails to respond to that motion, the Court will assume that the plaintiff concedes the insufficiency of its complaint. Indeed, failing to make an argument before the district court would, in the end, amount to a waiver of the argument on appeal. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Conrail, 965 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2020).
Nevertheless, the insufficiency of allegations in a complaint is not dispositive. Plaintiffs might be able to repair insufficient allegations without violating counsel’s obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Rules of Professional Conduct. And the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly instructed district courts that plaintiffs must generally be afforded “at least one opportunity to try to amend [their] complaint before the entire action is dismissed.” White v. Ill. State Police, 15 F.4th 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2021). Therefore, when a plaintiff fails to respond to a colorable motion to dismiss, the Court will grant the dismissal without prejudice, but will afford the plaintiff one additional opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint. Failure to respond to a second motion, or to timely repair the complaint, will result in a dismissal of the action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Attorneys—not the Court—are responsible for making their own arguments. Furthermore, if attorneys raise an argument, the Court expects that they will do their own research and developed that argument. If the parties do not care about an argument, or a claim, enough to spend time litigating that argument or claim, then the Court should not be expected to shoulder the responsibility for them. Additionally, if after reviewing an opponent’s motion, a party wishes to abandon a claim, that party should affirmatively stipulate to that concession on the record.
1. Waiving Arguments
If a party fails to respond to an opponent’s argument, the Court will find that the argument is waived for the purpose of the pending motion (but not for the purpose of future motions). Furthermore, perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived. United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1383 (7th Cir. 1991). For example, a two-sentence “argument” that cites no legal authority is not a legal argument. It is perfunctory, and the Court will not consider it. See Martinez v. Colvin, 12 CV 50016, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41754, at *26–27 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2014) (“[T]he Court notes that parties should not view judges as bloodhounds who are merely given a whiff of an argument and then expected to search the record high and low in an effort to track down evidence to locate and capture a party’s argument.”). Additionally, when an argument effectively requires analogous reasoning (think qualified immunity) but the brief contains no analogous reasoning, the Court may find waiver. And when responding to an argument, mere contradiction rather than a developed argument results in waiver. Id. at *27 (“[M]erely contradicting an opposing party’s developed argument with a single, unsupported sentence is not an argument.”).
2. Waiving Claims
Waiver of claims is treated differently. If the plaintiff evidences an intent to abandon a claim, it will be deemed waived. But critically, merely failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment is not evidence of abandonment of the claim. This occurs, for example, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, and the plaintiff fails to respond to the motion for summary judgment on one or all of its claims. Because the defendant bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit has instructed district courts not to summarily hold for the defendant when the plaintiff fails to respond to the motion on all or some claims. Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021).
Still, when the plaintiff fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment on all or some claims, one of two things is true (or both). Either the plaintiff does not care about the claim enough to form an argument, or the plaintiff affirmatively intends to abandon the claim. In either case, the Court should not have to waste valuable judicial resources researching and deciding the issue. Thus, if a plaintiff fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, on all or a subset of the claims, the Court will order the plaintiff to show cause why the claim should not be considered abandoned. Failure to respond to the Court’s order will result in a dismissal of the claim with prejudice for want of prosecution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
3. Motions to Dismiss
“Our system of justice is adversarial, and our judges are busy people. If they are given plausible reasons for dismissing a complaint, they are not going to do the plaintiff’s research and try to discover whether there might be something to say against the defendants’ reasoning.” Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999)). If the Court is presented with a colorable argument in a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff fails to respond to that motion, the Court will assume that the plaintiff concedes the insufficiency of its complaint. Indeed, failing to make an argument before the district court would, in the end, amount to a waiver of the argument on appeal. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Conrail, 965 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2020).
Nevertheless, the insufficiency of allegations in a complaint is not dispositive. Plaintiffs might be able to repair insufficient allegations without violating counsel’s obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Rules of Professional Conduct. And the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly instructed district courts that plaintiffs must generally be afforded “at least one opportunity to try to amend [their] complaint before the entire action is dismissed.” White v. Ill. State Police, 15 F.4th 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2021). Therefore, when a plaintiff fails to respond to a colorable motion to dismiss, the Court will grant the dismissal without prejudice, but will afford the plaintiff one additional opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint. Failure to respond to a second motion, or to timely repair the complaint, will result in a dismissal of the action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Parties to a bench trial shall comply with the following procedures and requirements. The parties must order the transcript upon the completion of the trial. Thirty-five days after completion of the transcript, the parties must jointly file a Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts. The parties must reasonably agree on the Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts. The Court understands that facts and the inferences drawn from facts can be—and usually are—very different. Undisputed facts should be admitted and the inferences drawn from those facts can be litigated in the memoranda of law. The Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts should be filed with the Court and a courtesy copy provided in Word format through the Court’s proposed order portal.
Twenty-one days after the filing of the Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts, the plaintiff shall file a memorandum of law with citations to the trial transcript and pertinent authority, along with any supplemental statements of fact not in the Statement of Stipulated Facts. Twenty-one days after the filing of the plaintiff’s memorandum, the defendant shall file a response brief, along with any supplemental statements of fact not in the Statement of Stipulated Facts and responses to the plaintiff’s supplemental statements of fact. Fourteen days after the filing of the response brief, the plaintiff shall file a reply brief and responses to the defendant’s supplemental statements of fact. All supplemental statements of fact and responses to supplemental statements of fact shall include citations to the transcript.
The court shall rule by mail unless the parties are otherwise notified. If counsel think of a better process, they are free to propose it to the Court. It’s all ears.
Parties to a bench trial shall comply with the following procedures and requirements. The parties must order the transcript upon the completion of the trial. Thirty-five days after completion of the transcript, the parties must jointly file a Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts. The parties must reasonably agree on the Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts. The Court understands that facts and the inferences drawn from facts can be—and usually are—very different. Undisputed facts should be admitted and the inferences drawn from those facts can be litigated in the memoranda of law. The Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts should be filed with the Court and a courtesy copy provided in Word format through the Court’s proposed order portal.
Twenty-one days after the filing of the Proposed Statement of Stipulated Facts, the plaintiff shall file a memorandum of law with citations to the trial transcript and pertinent authority, along with any supplemental statements of fact not in the Statement of Stipulated Facts. Twenty-one days after the filing of the plaintiff’s memorandum, the defendant shall file a response brief, along with any supplemental statements of fact not in the Statement of Stipulated Facts and responses to the plaintiff’s supplemental statements of fact. Fourteen days after the filing of the response brief, the plaintiff shall file a reply brief and responses to the defendant’s supplemental statements of fact. All supplemental statements of fact and responses to supplemental statements of fact shall include citations to the transcript.
The court shall rule by mail unless the parties are otherwise notified. If counsel think of a better process, they are free to propose it to the Court. It’s all ears.
If a party is moving to dismiss some, but not all, of the claims against it, it shall answer all of the claims against it and file a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) directed at the claims on which it seeks judgment. Partial motions to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) that seek to dismiss fewer than all claims against a party will be stricken, as will partial answers that accompany such motions, and the party who filed them will be directed to this standing order. A helpful article is The Forgotten Pleading by Judge Amy St. Eve and Michael Zuckerman available at https://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2010/SaintEve2.pdf.
If a party is moving to dismiss some, but not all, of the claims against it, it shall answer all of the claims against it and file a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) directed at the claims on which it seeks judgment. Partial motions to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) that seek to dismiss fewer than all claims against a party will be stricken, as will partial answers that accompany such motions, and the party who filed them will be directed to this standing order. A helpful article is The Forgotten Pleading by Judge Amy St. Eve and Michael Zuckerman available at https://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2010/SaintEve2.pdf.
Motion Type | Day | Time |
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Civil | N/A | N/A |
Criminal | N/A |